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The background to  Indian economic policy prior to 1991 is by now well 
documented ( see, for example, ). Some authors have argued that, in the ‘eighties, 
a wide variety of subsidies to domestic production and exports had led to a maze 
of  incentives which completely distorted resource allocation ( see, for example, 
Bhagwati and Srinivasan, Isher Ahluwalia). While the domestic policy led to 
unsustainable fiscal deficits, the trade policy was biased against exports. The end 
result was the state of external payment bankruptcy reached in 1991.  
Yet the failure of economic policy in India before 1991 was scripted forty 
years ago in the Second Five year Plan. There were a number of elements to the 
economic strategy laid out at that time. For one, trade as an engine of growth was 
ruled out by the “elasticity pessimism” of that time. The argument was that 
India’s exports being largely of primary goods were faced with inelastic demand 
in the world market. Ergo, any attempts to increase exports would lead to a 
decline in prices and hence export revenues. This “ foreign exchange constraint” 
was thus built into the Indian development strategy. Some authors have argued 
that this elasticity pessimism was subject to the “fallacy of composition” ( see,   ). 
In other words, while world demand for primary goods may be inelastic this does 
not imply that demand for any one country’s exports are also inelastic. In 
retrospect, India missed being part of the export boom which benefited the East 
Asian economies. But this must be put down to the development strategy rather 
than the lack of world demand for Indian exports.  
The trade strategy was complimented by a domestic strategy which 
focused on the need to develop a domestic industrial economy based on 
production of investment goods like coal, cement, steel etc. Given also that the 
Indian private sector was too small and myopic to undertake production of such 
“investment goods”, the “ socialist “ pattern of growth followed: a domestic 
industry dominated by the public sector (PS)  which was to occupy the 
commanding heights of the economy through production of  “ machines for 
machines” ( see, ). Finally, since investment demand was to be pushed then, in a 
resource scarce economy, consumption demand would have to be curtailed. This 
would be achieved via high consumption taxes and via industrial licensing to 
restrict production of  luxury goods like cars, air-conditioners etc. This control of 
production was enshrined in the Industrial Licensing Policy of 1955 which found 
its expression in the Industries Act of 1956. The control of monopolies, 
particularly after 1970, was entrusted to the Monopolistic and Restrictive Trade 
Practices Commission (MRTPC) following the promulgation of the MRTP Act of 
1975.  
     
The main problem with the  2nd Plan strategy as outlined above was that an 
industrial sector based on production of  “ machines for machines” turned out to 
be  highly import intensive ( see, ). This then implied an internal contradiction 
with the assumption of export pessimism. Further, in domestic industrial policy, 
the MRTP Act seemed to have been designed to only restrain production not 
increase it. In other words, the net result was creation of  “ entry barriers” in 
domestic industry ( see, ). Finally, the MRTPC was an attempt to control the 
creation of foreign monopolies in particular. In this it again failed in its basic 
objectives while creating an entry barrier for new foreign investments ( see, 
Martinussen, 1988; Pant, 1995). 
Given the above background, the objective of economic reforms after 
1991 was primarily to eliminate entry barriers to both domestic and foreign 
enterprise. However, some tentative measures in this direction were taken in the 
‘eighties itself particularly in eliminating the bias of trade policy towards an 
import substituting production sector. However, the strong vested interests created 
by 40 years of protection, meant that the only way to eliminate export bias was 
via export subsidies to counter the effect of import controls (see, for example,). A 
similar inertia of vested interests ensured continuation of  licensing controls on 
domestic industrial production.  
The principle effect of the crisis of 1991 was to create conditions in which 
measures could be taken to end some the distortion in internal and external trade 
outlined above. While the detailed policy measures will be discussed in the next 
section of this report, here we will see to what extent the measures to remove 
controls altered the structure of the Indian corporate sector. 
 
 1.2 .    Scope of Our Study 
 
  In one sense the economic reforms of 1991 were incomplete. The principle 
sector left out of the ambit of reforms was the agricultural sector. This was largely due to 
the fact that the reforms of 1991 were based on legislation by the Central government. On 
the other hand, agriculture in India is entirely a state subject. Hence any policy decisions 
in the context of agriculture have to be made by the state government. This has been so 
far hampered by political considerations. This is why it is only in the last two years or so 
that any imports of agricultural items by the private corporate sector (PVT) has been 
allowed in India. In any case, since the agriculture sector in India is not open to corporate 
activity it does not come under the ambit of the Competition Act passed in 2003. Hence 
we will leave out of our study the primary goods sector. 
 
  The second sector excluded for detailed analysis is the Small Scale 
Industries (SSI) sector. An SSI is defined as any production unit in the manufacturing 
sector with a paid up capital of  Rs. 10 million ( $ 4 million) or less. Whereas earlier, the 
SSI sector was also defined in terms of the level of employment, since 1999 the definition 
is only in terms of the level of paid up capital. The items produced  by the SSI sector are 
reserved for this sector in that the non-SSI units are not permitted to produce these items. 
This reservation has existed since 1970’s and any non-SSI unit producing these products 
had to freeze production at the old level. Hence, the SSI sector has deliberately been 
shielded from the effect of general competition in the corporate sector. In addition, this 
sector also receives 15 percent preferential purchase by the government and exemptions 
from Central excise tax and other local taxes. (see,NCAER, 2002). Data on the 
performance of the SSI is also not available on any continuous basis. The only source is 
periodic surveys of the national Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) which also releases 
the data at very irregular intervals. Given the protected status of the sector and the lack of 
any reliable data, it was decided to leave out this sector from our detailed study. 
 
 Our study then deals largely with the organized manufacturing corporate sector. 
Since this has been the sector most exposed to both domestic and external competition 
since 1991 a study of this sector gives us a good insight into the working of competition 
policy in India. Here we have two sets of data. At the aggregate level we can look at the 
relative importance of the private and public sectors based on published data of the 
Central agencies. However, this data does not permit any study at the more detailed 
sectoral level. Fortunately, exhaustive firm and sectoral level data is now available from 
the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE). The CMIE data base, PROWESS, 
is culled from the balance sheets of firms. The Indian Companies Act makes it mandatory 
for all firms operating in the organized sector to file yearly balance sheets with the 
Registrar of Companies as long as they are in operation. This constitutes the raw data on 
which the CMIE data is based. 
  The CMIE data base contains information on about 8000 companies. The 
coverage includes public, private, co-operative and joint stock companies, listed ( in the 
stock exchanges) or otherwise. Approximately, the coverage of this database is seventy 
percent of the manufacturing output of the organized industrial sector of India. 
PROWESS uses the detailed disclosures, which are mandatory in the annual accounts of 
companies in India. Besides it provides information from scores of other reliable sources, 
such as the stock exchanges, associations, etc. The coverage includes the detailed profit 
& loss account and balance sheet statements and ratios and funds flows based on these, 
half yearly results, products and plants, raw materials, history of capital changes, bonus 
and dividends, stock prices and related information, expansion plans etc. Different 
companies present accounting information differently. Inter year comparison, growth 
rates, inter-company comparisons and industry aggregates are all compromised by the 
uncritical use of raw data from annual accounts. CMIE's methodological framework for 
database normalisation addresses this problem. Databases are also subjected to rigorous 
formal validation and quality control. 
 In what follows we have used published data of the government for aggregate 
information. However, detailed sectoral data is complied from the PROWESS data base. 
1.3.      Relative Importance of Public Sector and Private Sector—A Macro Perspective 
 
 As the discussion of section 1.1. showed, the primary aim of the Industrial Policy 
Resolution of 1956 was to promote the PS to occupy the dominant position in India’s 
manufacturing sector. Hence, one of the primary components of the economic reforms 
undertaken after 1991 was to ease the entry barriers in the Indian manufacturing sector. 
Since the main entry barrier prior to 1991 was the system of licensing of production 
capacities as enshrined in the Industrial Policy of 1956, the first major reform was the 
Industrial Licensing Policy of 1991. While the detailed policy will be discussed in more 
detail in the next section of this report, here we note that the new Licensing Policy of 
1991 sought to ease entry barriers to the PVT in all but a few strategic industries ( see 
also Appendix A). In addition, it sought to allow automatic entry of  foreign investment 
also in a large set of sectors excluding only the agricultural sector, the sector reserved for 
SSIs and in production of final consumer goods ( for details of sectors where FDI is 
allowed see Appendix B). However, in the last two sectors automatic approval to foreign 
investment was permitted  in projects which were 100 percent export oriented.1
 How did the role of the PS in the manufacturing sector change after 1991? At the 
aggregate level the share of the PS in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross 
Domestic capital Formation (GDCF) is given in table 1. As an inspection  of the table  
indicates, while the share of the PS in GDP has remained at about 24-26 percent between 
1993/94 and 2001/02, its share in investment (GDCF) has declined dramatically from 
about 39 percent in 1993/94 to 25 percent by 2001/02. As we will see later on, the share 
of PS in GDP does not give a true picture of its importance in the production activity. 
This is because the data in Table 1 includes ( as the PS share) government spending on 
services like public administration which simply reflected the salary largesse handed out 
to government employees especially after 1996/97 ( see, Acharya, ). Second, the state has 
                                                 
1 Since 2001 as the TRIMS regulations of the WTO have become operative, 
such export stipulations have since been withdrawn. This has been 
particularly important for the automobile industry. Hence now FDI in 
consumer goods sectors is give on a case by case basis.   
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GDP at factor cost 











( in US $ bn. )         
         
% share of Public 
Sector  25.9 . 25.9 24.8 26.5 26.3 26.3 25.8
% share of Private 
Sector 74.1 . 74.1 75.2 73.5 73.7 73.7 74.2
         
Gross Domestic Capital 
Formation (unadjusted) 47 . 68.9 61.5 68.4 71 83.5 84.9
( in US $ bn. )         
         
% share of Public 
Sector  38.8 . 28.2 30.6 27.3 28.2 27.9 28.2
% share of Private 
Sector 61.2 . 71.8 69.4 72.7 71.8 72.1 71.8
Note: Conversion rate : 
$1 = Rs. 38.78         
         
Source:National 
Accounts Statistics         
           (various years)         
 
been withdrawing from investment activity as is clear from the decline in PS share in 
GDCF in Table 1. This has however mainly manifested itself in a decline in investment in 
the agriculture sector ( see, Bhalla).  
 We can also look at the relative position  of the PS and the PVT using data 
published by the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI). The ASI data is based on complete 
enumeration of  the organized industry ( the Census sector). Howoever, this data is 
available with a considerable time lag so that the latest available is for 1997/98. In 
addition, ASI data is only available at the industry and not the firm level of 
disaggregation. Finally, while we are able to get a  PS and PVT breakdown for some 
variables this is not possible for crucial variables like total production, capital etc. 
 In Table 2 below we present the relative share of the PS and PVT in total  
 
Table 2 
Industry-wise distribution of workers in public and 
private sectors (%)     
        











                                             
Food & etc.                   
(pub)      18.99 20.89 19.18 17.41 11.84 15.96 21.2
                                      
(pvt.) 81.11 79.11 80.82 82.59 88.16 84.04 78.8
        
Textile & textile 
product       (pub) 25.72 25.9 21.68 21.35 14.62 15.31 22.8
                                      
(pvt.) 74.28 74.1 78.32 78.65 85.38 84.69 77.2
        
Wood & Paper              
(pub) 38.36 38.94 37.25 37.74 31.39 27.06 
46.2
9
                                      
(pvt.) 61.64 61.06 62.75 62.26 68.61 72.94 
53.7
1
        
Chemicals                     
(pub) 28.88 28.43 27.85 27.7 24.5 19.23 
30.0
5
                                      
(pvt.) 71.12 71.57 72.15 72.3 75.5 80.77 
69.9
5
        
Non metalic minerals   
(pub) 16.11 16.96 18.32 17.6 10.66 12.29 
19.8
7
                                      
(pvt.) 83.89 83.04 81.68 82.4 89.34 87.71 
80.1
3
        
Metal + metal 
products        (pub) 44.61 45.36 41 42.85 38.04 34.46 
48.2
3
                                      
(pvt.) 55.39 54.64 59 57.15 61.96 65.54 
51.7
7
        
Eleactricals+non 
electricals(pub) 33.85 34.44 30.92 27.88 29.81 24.05 
16.5
1
                                      
(pvt.) 66.15 65.56 69.08 72.12 70.19 75.95 
83.4
9
        
Transport equipment     
(pub) 45.97 42.58 43.87 47.6 50.34 35.97 
37.7
3
                                      
(pvt.) 54.03 57.42 56.13 52.4 46.66 64.03 
62.2
7
        
Conventional+non 
conventional energy     
(pub.) 96.58 90.22 97.03 98.31 90.2 86.01 
98.6
8
                                      
(pvt.) 3.42 9.78 2.97 1.69 9.8 13.99 3.32
        
Services                        
(pub) 56.36 59.41 57.45 60.35 51.59 40.4 
55.1
2
                                      
(pvt.) 43.64 40.59 42.55 39.65 48.41 59.6 
44.8
8
        
        
Source: Annual 
Survey of Industries        
(Census survey of 
various years)        
 
    
employment in the organized sector. We have used the ASI data to aggregate 
employment into eleven industries at roughly the two-digit industry classification. A 
number of observations are in order from an inspection of table 2. First, the PS is 
dominant in terms of employment in wood and paper, chemicals, metal and metal 
products, transport and equipment, energy and service sectors. It accounts for about 30 
percent or more of employment in these sectors. Second, the dramatic increase in share of 
PS employment in the year 1997/98 in all sectors ( barring Electrical and Non-Electrical 
sector) probably reflects the fact that while the PVT has undergone some structural 
adjustment over the ‘nineties, the PS as an ‘employer of the last resort’ is unable to 
restructure employment as an efficiency measure. However, non-availability of data after 
1997/98 does not allow us to check this conclusion with additional data. 
 At the macro data level, given the availability of published data, we are unable to 
proceed any further to look at the relative importance of the PS and PVT particularly in 
the manufacturing sectors. We are however able to get considerably more mileage from 
the PROWESS data base. 
 In Table 3 we present the sectoral growth in sales in the period 1989-2003. As far 
as possible we have tried to match the two-digit sectoral classification used earlier. The 
 Table 3. 











14 5.8 8.7 
Financial service  39 5.3 17.4 
Food and Beverages  11 3 7 
Machinery 12 3.5 7.4 
Metals and Metals Product 
 
15 3 7.7 
Non Metalic Mineral Product 10 2.9 6.2 







Transport equipment 10 4 7.3 
 Note: Calculated by author using PROWESS data base. 
 
 data are presented for the beginning, mid-point and end of our reference period, 1988-
2001. 
Inspection of Table 3 indicates that in the first period of our study, 1989-95, all 
the sectors grew considerably faster than in the second period, 1995-2003. Second, the 
financial services sector grew at two to three times the rate at which other sectors grew in 
both the periods. Here two points need to be made. First, the high growth rate in the first 
period indicates the first rush of liberalisation as the Industrial Licensing Policy of 1991 
eased entry into the production sector. So, in a sense, the high growth rates indicate 
measurement against a fairly low production base prior to 1991. Second, the lower 
growth rates in the second period reflect the fact that the years 2001/02 and 2002/03 were 
recession years in the Indian economy as in most other economies of the world ( see, ). 
 
 Did the Industrial Licensing Policy (ILP) of 1991 actually foster competition? To 
see this we looked at the relative shares of PS and PVT in total sectoral sales during our 
reference period. The results are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table: 4. 
Share of Public Sector Enterprises in Aggregate Sales of the Industry: 1988/89-2000/01 
 
Sectors 
April 1988 to March 
1989 
April 1994 to March 
1995 
April 2000 to March 
2001 
Mining Sh. Of PSE No. of Firms Sh. Of PSE No. of Firms Sh. Of PSE No. of Firms
Coal and lignite 100 6 99.47 8 98.2 7
Crude oil and natural gas 100 2 97.38 2 99.17 3
Minerals 65.97 5 57.97 7 62.24 8
Electricity (gen+dist.)             
Electricity 54.19 6 64.43 7 73.31 7
Service(fin+non fin)             
Financial service 31.77 2 81.48 69 80.31 89
Health service 0 0 1.48 1 0 0
Hotel and tourism 26.05 2 16.08 4 11.55 3
Recreational service 0 0 0 0 4.63 1
Transport service 88.6 8 76.28 8 76.51 11
Communication 100 3 51.24 3 62.6 2
Trading 78.62 15 48.42 20 46.06 17
Construction             
Construction 30.42 7 22.75 8 5.55 10
Irrigation             
Irrigation 0 0 0 0 0 0
Manufacturing             
Chemical 65.74 31 59.06 42 64.79 39
Metals and metal product 53.78 12 41.6 15 30.26 13
Non metallic minerals 7.74 4 3.51 4 1.37 5
Textiles 12.73 16 2.68 14 1.85 16
Transport equipment 13.33 14 9.67 16 4.17 14
Machinery 39.04 18 21.98 33 15.04 25
Food and beverages 4.42 2 0.64 6 0.74 8
 




Inspection of table 4 indicates that the share of the PS has declined quite considerably in 
most of the sectors. In a sense this reflects the objectives of the ILP which was the 
withdrawal of the PS from production sectors. Did this take place via a policy of 
privatisation of PS enterprises or entry of new PVT firms ? While the details of India's 
privatisation policy will be discussed in the next section, it may be noted here that even 
as of now there is no consensus on the method and scope of  India's privatisation policy 
( see, for example, ). In fact, in the earlier part of our reference period, almost no 
privitisation was carried out. Hence, we can assume that the decline in share of PS shown 
in Table 4 was largely a consequence of new entry of PVT and non-expansion of the PS. 
Some aspects of entry in the Indian corporate sector will be discussed in a later part of 
this report.  
 Second, in some sectors the PS has actually increased its dominance. These are 
Electricity, Financial Services and Chemicals where the shares of the PS in total sales has 
increased between 1988/89 and 2000/01. Third, in some other asectros the PS has 
maintained its dominating position with over 40 percent of sales. These are Mining and 
Transport and Trading Services. Finally, it may be noted that the number of PS firms in 
this period has increased continuously even though their share in total sales may have 
declined.  
However, a look at more disaggregated data indicates that the increasing share of 
the PS in some areas is not a generalized phenomena. While the increasing importance of 
the PS in Mining reflects the strategic nature of these industries, the dominance in 
Electricity is largely a reflection of lack of clear deregulation policy in this sector along 
with the poor experience with Independent Power Producers (IPPs) in all the regions of 
the country. The specific case of the Enron Power company in the state of Maharashtra is 
well known. ( see, for example, ). Third, the increasing share of the PS in Financial 
services is a reflection of the vast retail network of PS banks like the State Bank of India 
which private banks ( domestic and foreign) cannot easily match. Finally, the dominance 
of the PS in Chemicals is largely on account of the three large PS oil firms, Oil and 
Natural Gas Commission (ONGC), Hindustan Petroleum (HP) and Indian Oil 
Corporation (IOC). Once again, in the oil sector there is still considerable disagreement 
on what are the sector that should be privatized, profit making or loss making? There is 
also disagreement on the method of privatization:  strategic sales, auctions of government 
equity or public offloading of equity  ( see, ). In 2004, some degree of government 
control of oil companies is being reduced by offloading shares to ordinary investors while 
a few large private sector firms have begun to emerge. However, in this sector the large 
capital requirements is a natural barrier to entry ( see, ).  
1.4. Foreign Investment 
Apart from the changing share of PS and PVT in the Indian corporate sector, the other 
major feature of the ILP was the special space given to foreign investment. To quote 
from the ILP,  “ Direct Foreign Investment has always been preferred to loans and 
other forms of assistance”. It has been argued that Indian’s foreign investment policy 
has gone through three phases. Phase 1 lasted from 1960-1980 and was the most 
restrictive.  The cornerstone of the policy was the restrictive Monopolies and 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTPA) , 1973 and the Foreign Exchange 
Regulation Act (FER), 1975. While the former act was implemented thorough the 
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (MRTPC) the latter was 
enforced via the Reserve Bank of India. While the details of these agencies will be 
discussed in the next section, it may be noted that many commentators have argued 
that these agencies served more to prevent new foreign investment (FDI) rather than 
control the operations of foreign monopolies ( see, for example, Martinussen,1988;  
Pant, 1995). However, starting from the Technology Policy Statement of 1982, the 
policy towards FDI was gradually liberalsied. However, it was only in 1991 that 
technology and equity ownership were finally unbundled while, in the last few years 
the more liberal Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) and the Competition 
Commission of India have finally replaced the old FERA and MRTPA. 
 This is quite clear in Table 5 below which show the jump in FDI in India in the 
‘nineties as compared to the earlier decades.  
 
   ****** Table 5********** 
 
In which areas has FDI concentrated? This is brought out clearly in table 6 below. 
TABLE 6 
Sectorwise Distribution of FDI 
Approvals, 2001 
 
Sector No. of Approvals Approvals 
($ billion) 
% Share 
Telecommunication 75 2.1 34 




736 .44 7.4 
Services ( Financial 
and Non-financial) 
94 .35 5.8 
Metallurgical 
Industries 
25 .214 3.6 
Total 990 4.7 79 
 
Source: Website of Confederation of Indian Industries (CII)    
 
It is clear from an inspection of  Table 6 that the FDI flows in the last decade have 
shifted from the earlier focus on Chemicals and Electrical products to Fuels and 
Telecommunications. This has been a consequence of changing government policy 
after 1991. Prior to 1991, FDI policy was guided by considerations of technology so 
that only FDI which brought in foreign exchange ( or was export oriented ) was 
encouraged. The unbundling of technology and equity after 1991, was accompanied 
by an emphasis on FDI oriented towards domestic infrastructure ( see, Pant, 2002).  
 
 How important has FDI been in sectoral flows? To see this we calculated the 
share of sales of foreign owned firms (defined as those with equity of at least 10 
percent owned by companies with headquarters located outside India) using our 
CMIE data base. It is useful to have this information at the level of products and in 
terms of domestic sales. Such information is not available from the published data of 
the Reserve Bank of India. Hence we have done our own calculations using firm level 
data at a fairly disaggregated level.  The results of our calculations are  shown below 
in table 7.  
 
TABLE 7 
SHARE OF FOREIGN FIRMS IN INDUSTY SALES: 1989,1995,2001 
 
  SL NO.  SECTOR 1989 1995 2001 
1 AUTO ANCILLARY 14.30  17.72 15.61 




61.71 65.69 64.43 




46.68 30.43 20.01 




33.57 30.88 25.39 
8 ELECTRONICS 16.08 14.00 12.51 
9 FERTILIZERS 0.25 2.20 0.02 
10 FINANCIAL SERVICE 44.43 7.87 7.71 




7.42 7.73 5.89 
13 
METAL AND METAL 
PRODUCT 








2.87 3.98 5.99 
16 ORGANIC CHEMICAL 8.75 4.96 5.02 
17 OTHER CHEMICAL 61.98 44.48 44.13 




17.44 23.21 22.79 




0.54 1.09 0.78 
22 PLASTIC PRODUCTS 5.80 4.00 5.68 
23 POLYMERS 1.33 2.03 6.46 
24 SOAPS, TOILETERIES 63.38 47.44 38.02 
25 SYNTHETIC TEXTILE 0.68 2.00 12.80 
26 TRADING 3.11 3.41 3.08 
27 TRANSPORT SERVICE 0.47 0.93 1.02 
28 TYRES AND TUBES 19.49 9.96 8.61 
 Inspection of table 7 indicates that foreign firms have increased their presence in 
8 sectors, namely,  automobiles and components, beverages and tobacco, foods 
products, non-electrical machinery, paints and varnishes, polymers and synthetic 
textiles. However, they still have a significant presence ( 25 to 40 percent) in three 
other sectors, dyes and pigments, electrical machinery and soaps and toiletries.  
 
  
1.4. The Privatisation Policy in the ‘Nineties. 
We have already noted that there is still no consensus on the mechanics of 
privatization policy in India although there is general agreement on the need for 
government to reduce its presence in sectors which are well served by the private 
sector. Consequently, lack of a political consensus on privatization implied that the 




Table No. 8 
Privatisation of India’s Public Sector Enterprises, 1991/92-2001/02 
 
 




for the year 
(Rs.  billion) 
Actual receipt 
(Rs.  billion) 
Methodology 
1991-92 47 25 30.4 Minority shares sold 
by auction method in 
bundles of very 
good, good and 
average companies. 
1992-93 35 25 19.1 Bundling of shares 
abandoned. Shares sold 
separately for each company 
by auction method. 
1993-94 . 35 Nil Equity of 7 companies sold 
by open auction but proceeds 
received in 1994-95. 
1994-95 13 40 48.4 Sale through auction method, 
in which NRI’s and other 
persons legally permitted to 
buy, hold or sell equity, 
allowed to participate. 
1995-96 05 70 3.6 Equities of 4 companies 
auctioned and govt. 
Piggybacked in the IDBI 
fixed price offering for the 
fifth company. 
1996-97 01 50 3.8 GDR (VSNL) in international 
market. 
1997-98 01 48 9 GDR (MTNL) in 
international market. 
1998-99 05 50 53.7 GDR (VSNL) / Domestic 
offerings with the 
participation of FII’s          
(CONCOR, GAIL). Cross-
purchased by 3 oil sector 
companies i.e. GAIL, ONGC 
and IOC. 
1999-00 03 100 15.8 GDR (GAIL) in international 
market and MFIL’s strategic 
sale VSNL domestic issue. 
2000-01 03 100 18.7 BALCO, KRL (CRL) and 
MRL through strategic sale 
or acquisitions. 
2001-02 10 120 56.4 Strategic sales of CMC: 51%,  
HTL: 74%, VSNL: 25%, 
IBP: 33.58%, PPL: 74% and 
other modes: ITDC, HCI, 
STC, MMTC. 
Total 52* 663 259  
Source: Website, Ministry of Disinvestment, India. 
 
*  Total number of companies in which disinvestment has taken place so far. 
The stcok realization of Rs. 260 billion or so shown above accounts for just over 10  percent of  total  value 
of manufacturing output in 2001/02.  
 Note: Privatization means transferring the control of an enterprise from the govt. sector to the private 
sector. It can be accomplished by govt. selling 100% of an enterprise, or selling 51% or even by selling a 
minority stake. 
The govt. can raise money by selling some shares in state enterprise without transferring control to the 
private sector- but this is not privatization as such. 
 
 A perusal of table 8 indicates that the actual amount of privatization achieved till 
about 2002 is very small. In fact, the total stock of proceeds through privatisation till 
2002 at about Rs. 259 billion is just about 10 percent of the total value of PS 
manufacturing output in 2001/02. In terms of the share of PS assets the figure would be 
even smaller. Hence, increased PVT sector shares in sales in the manufacturing sector has 
come about through new entry rather than take over of PS enterprises. 
 
 Some observation of the privatization policy in India are in order. For one, as 
indictated in the last column of table 8, the general principle has been privatization of PS 
firms via strategic sales to existing firms in the PVT sector or to Non Resident Indians 
(NRIs). Even NRI sales are normally accepted not in individual capacity but via legal and 
registered foreign institutional investors (FIIs). The use of strategic sales is mainly due to 
the fear that releasing large blocks of  PS stocks in the Indian stock market would 
destabilize the market. In addition, the restriction on sales to only NRI external buyers 
reflects the political sensitivity of the issue of privatization. 
 Second, the real big ticket disinvestments were undertaken only after 1996/97. 
Here the objective was disinvestment of small number of strategic PS enterprises in the 
infrastructure sector. For example both Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited (VSNL) and 
Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited (MTNL) are large public sector concerns in the 
telecommunications sector. Similarly, Gas Authority of India Limited (GAIL), Container 
Corporation of Indian (CONCOR) and Bharat Aluminium Company (BALCO) are 
infrastructure companies. As is seen in the last column of table 8, fear of spoiling the 
domestic stock market and the recessionary conditions in the Indian corporate sector was 
the reason why these large PS firms were privatized via issue of Global Depository 
Receipts (GDRs) to foreign strategic investors.  
 Finally, the economic logic that the government should not be in areas where the 
market is well developed and can deliver the goods is still not the underlying philosophy 
behind privatization. In fact, the primary objective of the stop and go privatization in 
India has been to bridge the fiscal deficit and postpone politically unpleasant taxation 
decisions ( see, for example, ). 
 In general it is safe to conclude that privatization in India has been insignificant, 
half baked and not based on any consistent economic logic. 
1.5 Conclusion. 
 Our objective in this paper has been to document the changes that have taken 
place in the Indian corporate sector particularly after the major liberalization measures 
taken after 1991. In particular we have noted that one of the objectives of the Indian 
Industrial Licensing policy after 1991 has been to reduce the role of the public sector 
enterprises and facilitate the growth of the private sector. Our study of the macro and firm 
level data of the Indian corporate sector in the period 1989 to 2001 indicates that there 
has been a substantial reduction of the role of the public sector vis a vis the private sector 
over our reference period. We have argued that the relative position of the PS and the 
PVT can change either by planned reduction of the share of PS particularly via large 
scale privatization or by allowing greater entry of the PVT sector.  
 Our study concludes that the declining role of the PS in Indian corporate sector 
has come about largely by greater entry of PVT. This includes both domestic players and 
foreign players via foreign direct investment. However, the privatization policy is still in 
its infancy largely because of lack of consensus on the long term objectives of the policy. 
Appendix A. 
1.1 Industries reserved for PSUs prior to July 1991 
I. Arms and Ammunition and allied items of defence equipment.  
II. Atomic energy.  
III. Iron and steel.  
IV. Heavy castings and forgings of iron and steel.  
V. Heavy plant and machinery required for iron and steel production, for 
mining, for machine tool manufacture and such other industries as may be 
specified by the Central Government.  
VI. Heavy electrical plant including large hydraulic and steam turbines.  
VII. Coal and lignite.  
VIII. Minerals oils.  
IX. Mining of iron ore, manganese ore, chrome ore, gypsum, sulphur, gold and 
diamond.  
X. Mining and processing copper, lead, zinc, tin molybdenum and wolfram.  
XI. Minerals specified in the Schedule to the Atomic Energy (Control of 
Production and Use) Order 1953.  
XII. Aircraft.  
XIII. Air transport.  
XIV. Rail transport.  
XV. Ship building.  
XVI. Telephones and telephone cables telegraph and wireless apparatus 
(excluding radio receiving sets).  
XVII. Generation and distribution of electricity.  
Through Notification No. 477(E) dated 25.7.1991; the industries reserved for 
PSUs were reduced to eight areas from the previous list of seventeen.  
 
1.2 Industries reserved for PSUs since July 1991 
   
(I) Arms and Ammunition and allied items of defence equipment, defence aircraft and 
warship.  
(II) Atomic Energy.  
(III) Coal and Lignite.  
(IV) Mineral Oils.  
(V) Mining of iron ore, manganese ore, chrome ore, gypsum, sulphur, gold and 
diamond.  
(VI) Mining of copper, lead, zinc, tin, molybdenum and wolfram.  
(VII) Minerals specified in the schedule to Atomic Energy (Control of production and 
use) Order, 1953.  
(VIII) Railway Transport.  
 
 
This list by December 2002 includes only three areas reserved for PSUs:  
 
(I) Atomic Energy. 
(II) Minerals specified in schedule to atomic Energy (Control of Production and 
Use) Order, 1953.  
(III) Railway Transport.  
 
Appendix B. 
List of Industries subjected to compulsory licensing: 
1)  Coal and lignite ## 
2)   Petroleum (other than crude) and its distillation products ## 
3)   Distillation and brewing of alcoholic drinks 
4)  Sugar @ 
5)  Animal fats and oils* 
6)  Cigars and cigarettes of tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes 
7)  Asbestos and asbestos based products* 
8)  (Plywood, decorative veneers, and other wood based products such as 
particleboard, medium density fibre board, and block board. (All types of veneers 
come under compulsory licensing from 14.2.92))* 
9)  Raw hides and skins, leather, patent leather# and chamois leather*. 
10)   Tanned and dressed fur skins* 
11)   Motor cars # 
12)   Paper and newsprint except bagasse-based units* 
13)   Electronic aerospace and defence equipment; all types. 
14)   Industrial explosives, including detonating fuse, safety fuse, gunpowder, 
nitrocellulose and matches 
15)  Hazardous chemicals (under this, Industrial alcohol has been delicenced from 
14.2.92) 
16)   Drugs and Pharmaceuticals (according to Drug policy. By the review of drug 
policy in 1994, all bulk drugs and their formulations and intermediated except a 
few identified bulk drugs and formulations have been delicenced). 
17)  Entertainment electronics (VCRs, color TVs, C.D. Players, Tape Recorders)** 
18)  White goods (Domestic refrigerators, domestic dishwashing machines, 
programmable domestic washing machines, microwave ovens, air conditioners) #. 
 
(Note: # - These industries (excluding chamois leather) have been delicenced from   
                 23.4.93 
           ** - Delicenced from 2.12.96 
             *  - Delicenced from 17.7.97                          
            @ - Delicenced from 31.8.98. However, to avoid unhealthy competition  
                   among sugar factories to procure sugarcane, a minimum distance of 15   
                   KM would continue to be observed between an existing sugar mill and a 
                   new mill by exercise of powers under the Sugarcane Control Order, 1966 
             ## - Delicenced since 8.6.1998) 
 
Annex II: List of industries for automatic approval of foreign technology 
agreements and 51% foreign equity approvals 
1)  Metallurgical Industries 
2)  Boilers and Steam Generating Plants 
3)  Prime Movers (other than electrical generators) 
4)  Electrical Equipment 
5)  Transportation 
6)  Industrial Machinery 
7)  Machine tools and industrial robots and their controls and accessories, 
Jigs, fixtures, tools and dies of specilised types and cross land tooling, and 
Engineering production aids such as cutting and forming tools, patterns 
and dies and tools. 
8)  Agricultural Machinery 
9)  Earth Moving Machinery 
10)  Industrial Instruments 
11)  Scientific and Electro medical Instruments and Laboratory Equipment. 
12)  Nitrogenous & Phosphate Fertilizers falling under Inorganic fertilizers 
under '18-Fertilizers' in the First Schedule to IDR Act, 1951. 
13)  Chemicals (other than fertilizers). 
14)  Drugs and Pharmaceuticals (According to Drug Policy.) 
15)   Paper and pulp including paper products & Industrial laminates. 
16)   Automobile tyres and tubes, Rubberised heavy duty industrial beltings of 
all types, Rubberised conveyor beltings, Rubber reinforced and lined fire 
fighting hose pipes, High pressure braided hoses, Engineering and 
industrial plastic products. 
17)  Plate glass 
18)  Ceramics 
19)  Cement Products 
20)  High Technology Reproduction and Multiplication Equipment. 
21)  Carbon and Carbon Products 
22)  Pretension High Pressure RCC Pipes. 
23)  Rubber Machinery 
24)  Printing Machinery. 
25)  Welding Electrodes other than those for Welding Mild Steel 
26)  Industrial Synthetic Diamonds. 
27)  Photosynthesis improvers, Genetically modified free-living symbiotic 
nitrogen fixer, Pheromones, Bio-insecticides. 
28)   Extraction and Upgrading of Minor Oils 
29)  Pre-fabricated Building Material. 
30)  Soya Products 
31)      (a) Certified high yielding hybrid seeds and synthetic seeds and 
(b) Certified high yielding plantlets developed through plant tissue culture. 
32)   All food processing industries other than milk food, malted foods, and   
flour, but excluding the items reserved for small-scale sector. 
33)  All items of packaging for food processing industries excluding the items 
reserved for small-scale sector. 
34)  Hotels and tourism-related industry. 







 The tables in this appendix are derived from the PROWESS data base. The objective 
is to identify the sectors where public sector (PS) dominates 
We took three points of Time:-1989, 195, 2001(all financial years) 
(I) April 1998 to March 1989. 
(II) April 1994 to March 1995. 
(III) April 2000 to March 2001. 
The dominance of the PS has been defined as follows-: 
(I) Share > 80 % (exclusive dominance i.e. E.D). 
(II) Share > 50 % but Less than 80 % (dominant, D) 
(III) Share < 50 % (less dominant, LD). 
 
 
TABLE C. 1 - April 2000 to March 2001 









No. Of  PS 
fimrs 
Share of  PS in 
Sales 
No. Of  
firms 
(PVT) Dominance 
Coal and lignite 135.3 15.00 132.8 7.00 98.20 8.00E.D 
Crude oil and natural gas 266.6 7.00 263.9 3.00 99.17 4.00E.D 
Minerals 3557.09 38.00 2213.98 8.00 62.24 30.00Dominant 
Electricity (gen+dist.)               
Electricity 43277.04 41.00 31727.02 7.00 73.31 34.00Dominant 
Service (fin+non fin)               
Financial service 181422.54 847.00 145692.70 89.00 80.31 758.00E.D 
Health service 638.63 22.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.00  
Hotel and tourism 3428.66 82.00 395.87 3.00 11.55 79.00L.D 
Recreational service 1454.97 43.00 67.35 1.00 4.63 42.00L.D 
Transport service 18626.18 64.00 14288.96 14.00 76.71 50.00Dominant 
Communication 28462.42 42.00 17818.46 2.00 62.60 40.00Dominant 
Trading 69622.38 379 32068.29 17 46.06 362.00  
Construction               
Construction 41011.62 179.00 2274.21 10.00 5.55 169.00L.D 
Manufacturing               
Chemical 397469.69 912.00 257536.69 39.00 64.79 873.00Dominant 
Metals and metal product 88204.92 394.00 26694.89 13.00 30.26 381.00L.D 
Non metallic minerals 26164.58 209.00 358.97 5.00 1.37 204.00L.D 
Textiles 49289.99 537.00 912.61 16.00 1.85 521.00L.D 
Transport equipment 66082.63 227.00 2757.42 14.00 4.17 213.00L.D 
Machinery 99104.33 795.00 14909.72 25.00 15.04 770.00L.D 
Food and beverages 50332.05 496.00 372.80 8.00 0.74
 
488.00L.D 
Trading 69622.38 379.00 32068.29 17.00 46.06 362.00L.D 














Share of PS in 
Sales 
No. Of PVT 
Firms 
DOMINANCE
COAL AND LIGNITE 11301.06 16.00 11240.83 8.00 99.47 8.00 E.D 
CRUDE OIL AND NATURAL GAS 15007.58 5.00 14614.56 2.00 97.38 3.00 E.D 
MINERALS 1684.27 25.00 976.41 7.00 57.97 18.00 DOMINANT
ELECTRICITY        
ELECTRICITY 15832.61 25.00 10200.38 7.00 64.43 18.00 DOMINANT
SERVICE        
COMMUNICATION SERVICE 7846.19 14.00 4020.00 3.00 51.24 11.00 DOMINANT
FINANCIAL SERVICE 68057.61 676.00 55451.70 69.00 81.48 607.00 E.D 
HEALTH SERVICES 115.16 18.00 1.71 1.00 1.48 17.00 L.D 
HOTEL AND TOURISM 1947.60 71.00 313.09 4.00 16.08 67.00 L.D 
RECREATION 280.53 24.00 0.00  0.00 24.00 L.D 
TRADING 28781.67 310.00 13936.31 20.00 48.42 290.00 L.D 
TRANSPORT SERVICE 9493.35 42.00 7241.77 9.00 76.28 33.00 DOMINANT
CONSTRUCTION        
CONSTRUCTION 5164.29 109.00 1175.13 8.00 22.75 101.00 L.D 
MANUFACTURING        
CHEMICALS 137720.50 895.00 81330.90 42.00 59.06 853.00 DOMINANT
FOOD AND BEVERAGES 25675.93 457.00 164.10 6.00 0.64 451.00 L.D 
MACHINARY 46310.60 598.00 10179.91 33.00 21.98 565.00 L.D 
METALS AND METAL PRODUCT 51506.10 385.00 21428.02 15.00 41.60 370.00 L.D 
NON METALLIC MINERALS 15126.18 227.00 531.40 4.00 3.51 223.00 L.D 
TEXTILES 31072.07 550.00 832.45 14.00 2.68 536.00 L.D 
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 31544.43 180.00 3050.91 16.00 9.67 164.00 L.D 





(PS+PVT)  No. Of Firms 
 Total Sale 
s (PS) 
No. Of PS 
Firms 
Share of  
PS in 
Sales  
No. Of  forms 
(PVT)  DOMINANCE 
Coal and lignite 5952.66 6.00 5952.66 6.00 100.00 0.00Exclusive Dominance 
Minerals 478.38 8.00 315.58 5.00 65.97 3.00Dominant 
Crude oil & natural gas 7470.12 2.00 7470.12 2.00 100.00 0.00Exclusive Dominance 
Electricity            
Electricity generation and 
distribution 4099.16 13.00 2221.42 6.00 54.19 7.00Dominant 
Services            
Financial service 237.22 12.00 75.37 2.00 31.77 10.00Less dominant 
Health 11.90 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00Less dominant 
Hotel and tourism 540.59 19.00 140.83 2.00 26.05 17.00Less dominant 
Recreational services 48.01 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00Less dominant 
Trading 11566.31 70.00 9093.63 15.00 78.62 55.00Dominant 
Transport services 3505.06 20.00 3105.35 8.00 88.60 12.00Exclusive Dominance 
Communication 1362.53 3.00 1362.53 3.00 100.00 0.00Exclusive Dominance 
Construction             
Construction 1722.70 32.00 524.05 7.00 30.42 25.00Less dominant 
Manufacturing            
Chemical 53003.62 278.00 34843.39 31.00 65.74 247.00Dominant 
Food and beverages 7638.81 137.00 337.88 2.00 4.42 135.00Less dominant 
Metals & metal products 16941.90 125.00 9110.85 12.00 53.78 113.00Dominant 
Non-metallic mineral 
products 5362.74 81.00 415.24 4.00 7.74 77.00Less dominant 
Transport equipment 10995.37 99.00 1465.60 14.00 13.33 85.00Less dominant 
Textiles 8520.86 183.00 1084.54 16.00 12.73 167.00Less dominant 










It is obvious that promoting competitiveness is directly a function of the 
governmental regulations/polices that operate in national markets. It is also clear that 
competition policy must take account of all these government policies in determining the 
ease of  doing business in any country. While these policies obviously impact on each 
other for analytical convenience we separate them into domestic policy, trade policy, 
foreign investment policy, privatization policy, policies and regulations on mergers and 
acquisitions, competition law and the regulatory framework. Since our purpose here is to 
concentrate on competitiveness, we will discuss these policies from the point of view of 
how their evolution has aided or hindered competition. Thus we might want to ask to 
what extent changes in domestic policy has aided or hindered entry and exit in the Indian 
industrial sector? In the same way, in policy liberalization governments often maintain a 
discretion to interfere with the market forces. We will attempt to identify these 
discretionary instruments in the hands of the government. In what follows, while 
discussing the policies, we will try, as far as possible, to indicate some quantitative 
measures regarding the degree of competitiveness encouraged by policy changes. Finally, 
we will note how policies of sub-national authorities modified (if at all) the effects of 
national polices. 
2.1. Domestic Policy 
As we mentioned in the first part, India’s domestic Industrial Policy was first 
defined in the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 (IPR)  which was put into operation 
by the Industries Act of 1956. The broad objectives of the IPR can be listed as follows: 
(i) Reserving certain sectors for production by the PS alone. (see, Appendix 
A). Here the logic was that not only were these sectors of strategic 
importance but, given the scarcity of  resources with the nascent PVT only 
the state could promote industrialization in these sectors according to 
national priorities. The implication of this policy decision was that 
existing PVT firms in these areas could not increase production without a 
license from the Ministry of Industry while new production was banned. 
(ii) To promote investment in priority areas, consumption in non-priority areas 
( automobiles, durable consumer goods etc.) would have to be curtailed. 
Since this cannot be done compulsorily in a democracy, it would be 
necessarily to control production. Hence all PVT firms would have to 
procure license from the Licensing Authority of the Ministry of Industry 
for both expanding existing production and/or undertaking new production. 
(iii) Certain areas of production ( gems and jewellery, textiles and clothing, 
handicrafts etc) were reserved for production by the SSIs. The limit of 
SSIs was defined in terms of  value of plant and machinery, sales and 
employment). Here the objective was the equity objective—SSIs could not 
compete with large industry and hence needed “infant industry” protection. 
In addition, since the reserved sectors were generally labour intensive, the 
objective of promoting employment was also achieved. 
In a nutshell, the primary objective of the IPR was to restrict production by regulating 
entry into organized industry. The onus for industrialization was thus to lie with the PS 
industries. 
While some de facto entry liberalisation may have begun in the ‘eighties itself, it 
was the Industrial Licensing Policy of 1991 (NIP) which gave legal status to entry 
liberalization.The primary consequence of the NIP was the removal of  licensing of 
additional production and/or expanding existing production. There was no necessity of 
getting license for substantial expansion, unless the product was reserved for SSIs. In 
addition, there were some procedural simplification. For example, registration schemes 
like Delicensed Industries Registration Scheme (DLR), and Exempted industries 
registration scheme (EIR) were abolished.  Furthermore, registration of industries with 
authorities like, DGTD, Textile Commissioner and Development Commissioner for Iron 
and Steel was no longer  necessary. The Phased Manufacturing Programme was first 
made inapplicable to new projects and now has been eliminated altogether. In general, 
the effect of the NIP was to make entry of PVT substantially easier than before. 
Did entry become easier after 1991? There is no official data on entry of new 
firms into the manufacturing sector. However, under the Indian Companies Act, all firms 
have to file their annual balance sheets with the Registrar of Companies. Hence, as a first 
approximation, the year in which a firm is incorporated is a good proxy for the entry of a 
new firm. This data is readily available in our PROWESS database for our reference 
period. The data so generated, at a two digit level of aggregation, is shown in table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 
Gross Entry of New Firms in Manufacturing in India 
1989-2003 
Sector 1989-1995 1996-2003 
Manufacturing 1656 284 
Food and Beverages 285 23 
Textiles 251 26 




Metals and Metal Products 153 20 
Machinery 338 122 
Transport Equipment 28 23 
Services 1002 128 
Source: Authors calculations 
 
As we have noted the data above is based on date of incorporation of a company. 
While this is not the same as the date on which production is started, it does indicate the 
intentions of the company to commence production. In addition, our data base only gives 
us data on  entry and not exit of companies. While we will comment on this in more 
detail in the next chapter, it is useful to note that in India there is still no simple process 
of exit of firms which are not small scale industries. Firms which want to wind up have to 
make an application to the Bureau for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) 
giving the reasons for closing down. Till 2002, exit was determined by one of three 
agencies, the Company Law Board, the BIFR and the High Courts ( for winding up 
companies). While the details will be discussed in the next chapter when we look at 
regulatory agencies, here we note that exit is long drawn affair in India and permitted 
only when all possible methods of revival of firms have failed. 
Keeping this in mind we must view the objectives of the ILP mainly to facilitate 
entry of PVT into manufacturing. As can be seen from Table 2.2, there was a large rush 
by companies to enter manufacturing particularly in the first part of our reference period, 
that is, 1989-1995. The concentration was naturally in the fastest growing sectors like 
food and beverages, textiles and chemicals sub-sectors of manufacturing and in the 
services sectors. The lower entry after 1995 is easy to understand: after initial entry 
possibilities were exhausted in the first period, entry in the second period was limited to a 
few competitive entrants. While we will study the phenomena of entry and exit in detail 
in a later chapter, here we have simply tried to show how after 1991 there has been a 
considerable degree of new entrants in Indian manufacturing sectors. 
2.2. Trade Policy 
As we noted in Chapter 1, the focus of economic reforms after 1991 was to effect 
changes in the external sector to cope with the possibility of default on external debt 
following the foreign exchange crisis of 1991. In this section we will see how various 
policy changes increased external competition in the manufacturing sector. 
There were three elements of the restrictive trade policy prior to 1991. For one, 
there were quantitative restrictions on most imports. Second, there were strict exchange 
controls along with a fixed exchange rate policy. Third, the average rate of tariffs were 
around 300 percent. The policy changes towards a more competitive external regime was 
achieved in a series of steps. 
The first step was to move towards a system of flexible exchange rates. Starting in 
1991 a 19 percent devaluation of the rupee vis a vis the dollar was followed by freeing all 
exchange controls and letting the market determine the exchange rate. Gradually, foreign 
exchange restrictions were lifted from a large number of transactions on the current and 
capital account. Today, barring large value transactions on the capital account which need 
to be ratified by the Reserve Bank of India, the exchange rate for almost all transactions 
on current account and short term capital account are determined freely in the foreign 
exchange market. Further, capital account transactions under $100 million are also freely 
permitted for foreign investors. On the trade account exporters and importers obtain their 
foreign exchange freely in the market while there are no restrictions on transfer of capital  
for payments of dividends etc. on the short term capital account. Today, for all practical 
purposes the value of the Indian rupee is freely determined in the market though the RBI 
does undertake market intervention to prevent disorderly movements in the exchange rate. 
In sharp contrast to the situation before 1991, today the RBI is more concerned with a 
possible appreciation of the Indian rupee rather than a depreciation ( see, Economic 
Survey, 2003). 
The freeing of the rupee was accompanied by measures to reduce the quantitative 
restrictions and the high tariff barriers. The quantitative restrictions were gradually 
reduced and by 2000-01, they were abolished. Also the peak level of nominal tariffs was 
reduced from 150 % in 1991-92 to just 20 % in 2003-04. These changes are summarised 
in Tables 2.2.and 2.3. below. 
 
Table 2.2. 
Changes in Quantitative Restrictions 
 
Total number of Tariff lines as on 01.04.1996 10202 (10 digit) 
Tariff lines free as on 01.04.1996 6161 






The QRs in respect of 1429 tariff lines were withdrawn preferentially for imports from 






Average Nominal Import Tariffs, 1991-2004 
 
Year Tariff 
1991-92 Reduced to 150% 
1992-93 To 110% 
1993-94 To 85% 
1994-95 To 65% 
1995-96 To 50% 
1996-97 No change 
1997-98 To 45% 
1998-99 No change 
1999-2000 To 40% 
2000-01 To 35% 
2001-02 To 30% 
2002-03 To 25 % 
2003-04 To20% 
 
Source: Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, various years. 
 
It is indicative of the opening up of the economy that even the ‘holy cow’ of Indian 
industry , the SSIs, were opened up fully to import competition by 2002. This is shown in 
Table 2.3 below. 
 
Table 2.3 






Remaining Items Under 
Reserved List 
1998-99 821 478 343 
1999-2000 812 576 236 
2000-2001 812 643 169 
2001-2002 799 799 NIL 
Source: http://www.smallindustryindia.com/policies/preseve.htm
 
Tables 2.1 to 2.3 are a good indication that both in respect of quantitative 
restrictions and nominal tariffs, the degree of protection available to the Indian 
manufacturing sector declined considerably after 1991. It may be argued that the decline 
in nominal protection does not reflect the decline in the effective rate of protection (ERP) 
for imports. In general, the existence of exemptions from import tariffs and non tariff 
barriers (NTBs) and the differential import tariffs on intermediate goods and final goods 
would lead to a divergence of nominal and effective rates of  protection ( see, Corden, 
1971 ). However, in the Indian context it has been seen that the ERPs have also shown an 
across the board decline in the ‘nineties ( see, Nouroz, 2001). This is shown in Tables 2.4 
below and Table A.2. of the Appendix A. 
 
Table 2.4 : Frequency distribution of tariff rates                           
                          Share of imports in the range (%) 
Nominal protection range 1987-88 1997-98 
00.0-25.0 11.17 26.48 
25.1-50.0 26.41 73.21 
50.1-75.0 10.02 0.10 
75.1-100.0 30.99 0.00 
100.1-125.0 9.39 0.17 
125.1-150.0 7.66 0.02 
150.1-175.0 3.53 0.00 
175.1-200.0 0.64 0.02 
200.1-225.0 0.06 0.00 
225.1-250 0.12 0.00 
>>250.1 0.00 0.00 
0-250 100 100.00 
Source: Protection in Indian manufacturing: an empirical study, Hasheem Nouroz(op.cit.) 
Table 2.4 gives the frequency distribution of nominal tariffs in the period 1987-88 
to 1997-98. Inspection of the table clearly indicates that by the period 1997-98 almost 
100 percent imports were in the tariff range less than 50 percent as compared to the 
period 1987-88 when over 60 percent of imports were in the tariff range of 75 percent or 
above. This indicates that the gradual reduction in peak tariff rates over the years has also 
result in a reduction of the average tariff rate. 
The reduction in protection level comes out even more clearly in Table A.2. in the 
Appendix where the  Effective Rate of Protection (ERP) is given for a select number of 
commodities at the two-digit level of classification. The table clearly indicates that the 
ERPs have been falling in line with the decline in the NRP that we have already 
discussed in detail. 
It is thus quite reasonable to infer that the tariff protection levels in Indian 
manufacturing sector have declined quite dramatically particularly after the 1991 reforms. 
2.3 Anti-Dumping Duties. 
One of the regulatory instruments available to curb " unfair" foreign competition is the 
anti-dumping instrument. While anti-dumping duties have a history that goes back to the 
'sixties, the codification of anti-dumping measures, the definition of anti-dumping and the 
process of dispute settlement was strictly defined only in the Urguay Round Agreement 
of 1995 in the Anti Dumping Agreement (ADA). It has been argued that the 'single 
undertaking' clause of the Uruguay agreement removed the benefit of 'non-reciprocity' 
available to most developing countries since the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations in the 
'seventies, Consequently, some other measures had to be introduced to provide a 
temporary shield to developing countries in the process of adjusting to foreign 
competition ( see, Pant, 2002). 
However, studies of the use of the ADA particularly in the late 'nineties 
indicate that anti-dumping duties might well be becoming a method of permanent 
protection. In one study, Aggarwal (2003), has argued lucidly that anti-dumping 
rather than being an anti-trust instrument is becoming a permanent protectionist 
instrument in both developed and developing countries. This is clear in Table 2.6, 
below. 
 
Table 2.6: Top eleven anti-dumping users: 1996-2000 




% share within the 
country group 
OECD 
EU 14.0 1 34.0 
US 12.5 2 30.0 
Australia 8.0 5 20.0 
Canada 5.0 7 12.0 
Newzealand 2.0 11 4.0 
Upper middle 
Argentina 8.0 6 31 
Brazil 5.5 8 21 
Mexico 3.0 9 12 
Korea 2.7 10 11 
Lower middle 
South Africa 10.0 4 62 
Low income  
India 12.5 3 81 
Source: working paper No.113, Patterns and determinants of antidumping: a worldwide perspective: 
Aradhana Aggarwal ( 0ctober’03), ICRIER. 
 
As is clear from the table above, both developed and developing countries 
have shared equally in initiating anti-dumping cases. In fact, today, India is 
considered to be the largest initiator of anti-dumping cases with China the chief 
victim. 
It is also shown in table 2.7 below that the primary targets of anti-dumping 
actions have been the developing countries themselves. Thus, as shown in the table, 
the strange paradox in the second half of the 'nineties is that developing countries are 
both the major initiators and victims of anti-dumping measures. In addition, 
inspection of Table 2.7 indicates that, with the exception of Brazil, the majority of 
cases by both developed and developing countries are filed against developing 
countries. In the case of the European Union, for example, almost 75 percent of the 
AD cases have been filed against developing countries. For India the figure is about 
63 percent and South Africa, 55 percent. 
Table 2.7 
Anti-Dumping Initiations by main countries, 1995-2003 
COUNTRIES CASES INITIATED 
BY(%) 
CASES INITIATED AGAINST 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
USA 329(13.61) 227 
SOUTH AFRICA 166(6.87) 91 
SOUTH KOREA 59(2.44) 33 
CHINA 72(2.98) 57 
BRAZIL 109(4.51) 38 
INDIA 379(15.68) 236 
EUROPEAN UNION 274(11.34) 190 
* Figures in brackets indicate the percentage to total number of cases filed by all countries. 
Note: Authors calculations based on WTO data base. 
Has anti-dumping been used by India as an anti-competitive device? To see this 
we collected evidence on anti-dumping initiation by India in recent years and the sectors 
to which these anti-dumping measures were applied. This is shown in Table 2.8 below. 
Table 2.8. 
Sectoral Break-up of AD intiations by India, 2002-2003 






Note: Authors calculations. 
 
It is interesting to note that of  the 370 cases filed by  India in the period 1995 to 2003, 
over one-third were filed in the period 2002-03 alone. In addition, it would seem that 
India has been using the AD duties as a protective device. This is clear from Table 2.8 
above where the maximum initiations have been in the chemicals sector and against 
China in particular.( For more detailed product coverage see Table A.1. of the Appendix).  
The chemicals sector is one where India has in general been a net importer. Similarly, the 
large number of AD duties in the fibers sector is surprising given that India principal 
exports have been of products in this segment.  
We have argued earlier that anti-dumping has been used as a protective device by 
developing countries after the ‘non-reciprocity’ clause was dropped from trade 
negotiations from the Uruguay Round onwards. However, it is possible that AD duties 
may be levied to reflect domestic political economy considerations rather than as a 
general protective device. To answer this question we need to know what is the value of 
goods on which anit-dumping is initiated as a ration of total value of imports of these 
goods. 
The answer to thi question is not easy to get as existing data only pertains to the 
volume of import goods at a disaggregated level. In addition, all we know is the items on 
which AD action has been initiated. We have tried to get the relevant data for the class of 
items, chemicals, which have been subject to maximum AD duties. We first calculated 
the total value of all chemical items defined as  Chemical Elements and Compounds and 
some Medicinal and Pharmaceutical products, from the Economic Survey. Call this M1 . 
We then calculated the total import value of all items on which  anti-dumping has been 
initiated. Call this M2 . Finally, we calculated, M3 , the value of imports of all itmes on 
which AD duties are imposed on 20 percent or more of  imports. We then calculated the 
ratios M2/M1 and M3/M1. If  AD is being used as a general protection device both the 
ratios should be high. On the other hand, if AD is motivated by only sectoral political 
economy considerations, the the first ratios is high but the second is low. The results for 
the chemicals sector is shown in table 2.8a below. 
 
Table 2.8a. 
Value of Chemical Imports Subject to Anti-Dumping Duties 
   2001   2002  2003 
M1 ($ mill.) 715   869  1044 
M2/M1 (%)  85.6   3.3  2.1 
M3/M1 (%) 19.2   1.1  1.0 
 
As is clear from the last row of the above table, the value of items where 20 percent 
of more of imports are subject to anti-dumping is fairly low particularly in 2002 and 2003. 
This suggest that dometic political economy considerations rather than genral 
protectionist policies drives India’s AD policy. 
2.3. Business climate in India: A comparative Assessment. 
In assessing competitiveness of the Indian economy we have so far relied on data 
on various policy changes. However, it is useful to look at how this competitiveness 
is perceived by the business community. Presently, countrywise assessment of 
business climate isa done by a number of organizations like the World Economic 
Forum (WEF) and the World Bank (WB). In general these assessments are done 
through a combination of survey data and hard economic data for the country 
concerned. Typically, these data are not always available on a continuous basis but 
on a world wide basis. In this section we will present data on india’s relative 
competitiveness vis a vis other countries of South Asia and comparable countries 
like China, Egypt and Brazil. 
 One indicator developed by the WEF is the so called growth competitiveness 
index. This index has three components: a technology index, a Public Institutions Index 
and a Macroeconomic Environment Index.  
1. The technology index is a weighted average of  an Innovation sub index, an 
Information and Communication Technology sub index and a Transfer of Technology 
sub index. Each sub index is a weighted average of a survey data index and an index 
based on hard data. 
Thus, the Innovation sub index is a weighted average of survey of companies inside a 
country relating to the degree of innovative potential of the country ( one-fourth weight). 
The survey collects data on companies assessment of the countries ability to absorb 
technology based on its R&D expenditure and links of industry and academia. The other 
part of the technology index ( weight of ¾) is based on data on tertiary enrollment in the 
country in 2000 and grants of US patents for the year 2002. Second, the technology 
transfer index is based on survey of companies on the importance of FDI and licensing as 
a means of transfer of technology. Finally, the ICT sub index is based on survey data on 
the access of schools to the internet, development of Internet Service Provider network 
and role of the government in promoting IT sectors via digital signatures as well as hard 
data on telephone and internet usage in the population.  
2. the Public Institutions Index. 
 Here survey data is used to equally weight answers relating to questions on 
contract enforcement and a corruption sub index. 
3. Macroeconomic Environment Index. 
This has three components: a stability index, a credit rating index and a government 
waste index with ½ weightage to the first component. The stability sub index is a 
weighted average of survey data on the recessionary condition of an economy and 
hard data on economic indicators like inflation, savings. Etc. The credit rating index 
is taken from the Institutional Investor Country rating for marcjh. 2003 and the 
government waste index is based on questionnaires regarding use of public funds 
and government subsidies. 
The overall index of growth competitiveness is based on an average of 1, 2 and 3. 
The final relative rankings are given below in Table 2.9. 
 
Table 2.9 
Overall growth competitiveness rankings. 
 
       Source: Global Competitiveness Report. (World economic forum 
Country 2001 2002 2003 
China 39 38 44 
Bangladesh 71 77 98 
India 57 54 56 
Srilanka 61 59 68 
Egypt - - 58 
Brazil 44 45 54 
Pakistan - - 73 
 
From the above Table 2.9 it is quite evident that among the major developing countries 
the position of India has been quite consistent. Although China has a higher rank relative 
to India, the point that’s is worth noting  is that the ranking of China and the other 
countries  has worsened over the years while that of India has improved or at least not 
changed significantly.  
 
 As some indication of how India ranks on the disaggregated indices we can look 
at the data available for the Technology Index and the Public Institutions index. The 
ranking by the two indices is given below in tables 2.10 and 2.11, respectively. 
 
Table 2.10 








Country 2001 2002 2003 
China 53 63 65 
Bangladesh 73 79 95 
India 65 57 64 
Srilanka 59 67 72 
Egypt - - 68 
Brazil 49 35 35 
Pakistan - - 83 
Source: Global Competitiveness Report. (World economic forum) 
 
Table 2.11 









Country 2001 2002 2003 
China 49 38 52 
Bangladesh 74 79 100 
India 48 59 55 
Srilanka 57 42 72 
Egypt - - 57 
Brazil 46 45 53 
Pakistan - - 74 
Source: Global Competitiveness Report. (World economic forum) 
 
It is clear from table 2.10 that India’s technological capabilities improved 
significantly in 2002 but then declined in 2003. however, over the three year period its 
relative ranking compares quite favourably to all the other countries barring Brazil which 
has improved its ranking significantly.  
 
However, the state of its public institutions ( table 2.11) does not offer such a rosy 
picture. Like all the other countries in the sample, its ranking in terms of public 
institutions has slipped drastically since 2001. This, however, seems to be a phenomena 
characterizing all the countries in our sample. 
 
It may be worthwhile to look at a direct comparison of India and the other 





Business competitive rankings. 
 
Country 2002 2003 
China 38 46 
Bangladesh 74 86 
India 37 37 
Srilanka 47 57 
Egypt - 58 
Brazil 33 34 







Source: Global Competitiveness Report. (World economic forum) 
 
Though the data in table 2.12 is available only for two years, it would seem that India 
seems to have maintained its realtive position while the other countries seem to have 
slipped in their rankings. In addition, only Brazil seems to have a superior 
competitiveness ranking. 
 The World Bank also compiles its own assessment of the competitiveness of 
countries. We have used two indicators, the costs of starting a business and the 
enforceability of contracts. Presumably, the lower the costs of starting a business and  the 
easier the legal mechanism to enforce a contract, the better the business climate of a 




Cost of Starting a Business. 
 




china 12 41 158.14 
Brazil 17 155 274.05 
Egypt 13 43 858.29 
Bangladesh 7 35 352.86 
Pakistan 11 24 177.98 
Srilanka 8 50 101.77 
India 10 88 238.90 






        year 2003-04 
Country Procedures 
(units) 
Duration(days) Cost(% of 
GNI* per 
capita) 
China 21 200 14.7 
Brazil 16 380 2.4 
Egypt 19 202 30.7 
Bangladesh 15 270 270.3 
Pakistan 30 365 45.8 
Srilanka 17 440 7.6 
India 22 365 95.0 
* GNI per capita in US $ 
   Source: IFC (International Finance Corporation) 
 
Table 2.14 measures the costs of starting a business in terms of the number of 
bureaucratic procedures required to start a business and the related cost of start up. On the 
other hand, given a firm is in business, table 2.15 measures the costs of enforcing 
contracts entered into in these countries in tersm of the legal process, the litigation fees, 
time taken for final settlement etc. While the costs of starting a business seem to be lower 
in India as compared to Brazil, Egypt and Bangladesh what is disquieting is the relatively 
longer time ( 88 days) taken to start a business in India relative to the other countries in 




2.4.  The Regulatory Framework 
 As India moved to a liberalized climate after 1991, one of the objectives was to 
give greater emphasis to market forces in determining output and profits. At the same 
time, it was necessary to create the regulatory institutions to determine when the 
conditions of competition are or are not being violated. In other words, the role of the 
state shifts to creating conditions conducive to competition by regulation of the 
competitive climate rather than entering into countervailing production through the public 
sector. 
 In the table below we indicate the set of regulatory agencies along with the sectors 
in which they are operative. It is clear from the table that there are still many areas where 
the responsibility for regulation does not rest with an independent regulatory agency but 




Sectors Name of the 
regulatory 
agency 
Name of the 
regulatory bill 
Passed (date) Structure of the regulatory authority 







August, 2001 At the Secretariat level, the Department is 
headed by a Secretary who is assisted by one 
Additional Secretary, three Joint Secretaries  
(including the Financial Adviser), one Project 
Advisor, seven Director/Deputy Secretaries, four 
Under Secretaries, fourteen Section Officers, one 
Desk Officer, One Economist, One Assistant 
Director (Official Language) and one Deputy 
Controller of Accounts, and their supporting 
staff. 
Electricity Ministry of 
Power 
The Electricity Bill, 
2001 
 
2001 At the Secretariat level, the Department is 
headed by a Secretary who is assisted by two 
Additional Secretary, five Joint Secretaries  
(including the Financial Adviser) 
Health services Medical Council 
of India, 
Pharmacy 








   
Transport 
services 




Communication TRAI* TRAI’s Directive 




March, 2004  
Trade Ministry of 
commerce and 










Irrigation Ministry of 
water 
resources 










1995 http://texmin.nic.in/ministry/mot with orgs.htm
Chemicals Dept. of 
chemicals and 
petrochemicals 
Interim policy for 
gas distribution 
projects in Gujarat
8 July, 2002 http://chemicals.nic.in/org1.htm
Food and 
beverages 




Tribunal Bill, 1992. 
1992 • The Secretariat of Industrial Approvals (SIA), 
Ministry of Commerce, Government of India  
• The Reserve Bank of India  
• Directorate General of Foreign Trade)  
• The Company Law Board  
• The Securities and Exchange Board of India *  
• The Stock Exchange authorities.  
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APPENDIX  A 
TABLE A.1. 
 
Detailed Sectoral Decomposition of the AD cases filed by India in (‘02-’03) 
 
SECTORS Dumping Margins no.of cases filed 
(pd). 
Country. 
Cchemicals    
Acyclic Alcohols    
 21.11% to 33.98% 31.1.2002 Brazil 
Flexible slabstock polyol  21.5.2003 Brazil 
Chloroquine Phosphate 43.66% 16.7.2003 China  PR 
Flexible Slabstock Polyol 82.53% 21.5.2003 China  PR 
Para Cresol 31.94 to 45.04% 27.8.2002 China  PR 
Calcium Carbide  20.6.2003 (R) China  PR 
Caustic Soda 74.02 to 80.03% 14.5.2002 China  PR 
Melamine  10.9.2003 China  PR 
Mica Pearl Pigment  23.12.2003 China  PR 
Borax Decahydrate 96.5% to 132.84% 25.11.2002 China  PR 
Potassium Carbonate 23.4% to 36.7% 19.12.2002 China  PR 
Titanium Dioxide 57.70% 16.1.2003 China  PR 
Met Coke (R) 60.5% to 96.4% 07.05.2002 China  PR 
Methylene Chloride Bulk 85.32% 19.8.2002 E.U. 
 Packed 55.75%   
Oxo Alcohols (R)  27.8.2002 E.U. 
6-Hexanelactum (Caprolactam)  22.9.2003 E.U. 
Mica Pearl Pigment  23.12.2003 E.U. 
Toluene Di-Isocyanate  20.10.2003 E.U. 
Cyclohexanone  8.10.2003 E.U. 
Propylene Glycol  22.8.2003 E.U. 
PVC Paste Resin  22.8.2003 E.U. 
Potassium Carbonate 4.5% to 18.6% 19.12.2002 E.U. 
Caustic Soda 489.36% 8.10.2002 E.U. 
Sodium Hydrosulphite 69.01% 14.11.2002 Germany 
Caustic Soda 299.87% 8.10.2002 Indonesia 
Oxo Alcohols (R)  27.8.2002 Indonesia 
Hexamine 67.75% 18.9.2002 Iran 
Ammonium Nitrate 150.65% 20.9.2002 Iran 
Oxo Alcohols (R)  27.8.2002 Iran 
6-Hexanelactum (Caprolactam)  22.9.2003 Japan 
Micra Pearl Pigment  23.12.2003 Japan 
Toluene Di-Isocyanate  20.10.2003 Japan 
Met Coke (with Ash content less 
than 18%) 
39.63% to 53.56% 20.3.2003 Japan 
Methylene Chloride  19.2.2003 Korea, 
Republic of 
Sodium Hydrosulphite 102.56% 14.11.2002 Korea, 
Republic of 
Flerxible Slabstock Polyol 39.41 to 70.34% 21.5.2003 Korea, 
Republic of 
Caustic Soda 53.22 14.5.2002 Korea, 
Republic of 
Propylene Glycol  22.8.2003 Korea, 
Republic of 
Oxo Alcohols (R)  27.8.2002 Korea, 
Republic of 
Potassium Carbonate 47.3% to 38.7% 19.12.2002 Korea, 
Republic of 
Toluene Di-Isocyanate  20.10.2003 Korea, 
Republic of 
PVC Paste Resin  22.8.2003 Korea, 
Republic of 
Acyclic Alcohols 1.3% to 9.7% 31.1.2002 Malaysia 
(Oxo Alcohols)    
6-Hexanelactum (Caprolactam)  22.9.2003 Nigeria 
Oxo Alcohols (R)  27.8.2002 Poland 
Acyclic Alcohols 25.97% to 43.11% 31.1.2002 Romania 
(Oxo Alcohols)    
Calcium Carbide  20.6.2003 Romania 
Ammonium Nitrate 58.06% 20.9.2002 Russia 
Oxo Alcohols (R)  27.8.2002 Russia 
Polytetrafluoroethylene  8.10.2003 Russia 
Methylene Chloride Bulk 99.92% 19.8.2002 South 
Africa 
Acyclic Alcohols 24.42% 31.1.2002 South 
Africa 
(Oxo Alcohols 72.48%   
Oxo Alcohols (R)  27.8.2002 Saudi 
Arabia 
PVC Paste Resin  22.8.2003 Saudi 
Arabia 
Methylene Chloride Bulk 62.42% 19.8.2002 Singapore 
Acyclic Alcohols 46.63% 31.1.2002 Singapore 
(Oxo Alcohols) 50.63%   
Propylene Glycol  22.8.2003 Singapore 
Caustic Soda 58.79% 8.10.2002 Taipei 
Flexible Slabstock Polyol 88.36% 21.5.2003 Taipei 
Toluene Di-Isocyanate  20.10.2003 Taipei 
Cyc.ohexanone  8.10.2003 Taipei 
Potassium Carbonate 19.2% to 48.5% 19.12.2002 Taipei 
Sun/Dust Control Polyester Film 213% 3.3.2003 Taipei 
6-Hexanelactum (Caprolactam)  22.9.2003 Thailand 
Borax Decahydrate 15.41% to   79.44% 25.11.2002 Turkey 
Sun/Dust Control Polyester Film   United 
Arab 
Emirates 
Oxo Alcohols (R)  27.8.2002 United 
States 
Mica  Pearl Pigment  23.12.2003 United 
States 
Toluene Di-Isocyanate  20.10.2003 United 
States 
Cyclohexanone  8.10.2003 United 
States 
Propylene Glycol  22.8.2003 United 
States 
    
Metals    
Hot Rolled Coils, Strips, Sheets 
& Plates – II 
 25.9.2002 Australia 
Hot Rolled Coils, Strips, Sheets 
& Plates 
 25.9.2002 Canada 
Ball Bearings 98.97% to 344.46% 21.9.2002 China  PR 
Copper Clad Laminates 57.17% 24.12.2002 China  PR 
Non-Brass Metal Flashlights 468% to 798% 9.9.2002 China  PR 
Hot Rolled Coils, Strips, Sheets 
& Plates – II 
 25.9.2002 E.U. 
Copper Clad Laminates 40% 24.12.2002 Hong 
Kong. 
China 
Forged Rolls 11.05% 27.8.2002 Korea, 
Republic of 
Copper Clad Laminates 29.49% to 56.46% 24.12.2002 Korea, 
Republic of 
Copper Clad Laminates 14.47% to 39.47% 24.12.2002 Philippines 
Ball Bearings 253.17% 21.9.2002 Poland 
Hot Rolled Coils, Strips, Sheets 
& Plates – II 
 25.9.2002 Romania 
Ball Bearings 181.46% 21.9.2002 Romania 
Ball Bearings 436.78% 21.9.2002 Russia 
Forged Rolls 79.69% 27.8.2002 Russia 
Hot Rolled Coils, Strips, Sheets 
& Plates – II 
 25.9.2002 South 
Africa 
Hot Rolled Coils, Strips, Sheets 
& Plates – II 
 25.9.2002 Saudi 
Arabia 
Hot Rolled Coils, Strips, Sheets 
& Plates – II 
 25.9.2002 Singapore 
Copper Clad Laminates 40.67% 24.12.2002 Taipei 
Forged Rolls 60.13% 27.8.2002 Ukraine 
Hot Rolled Coils, Strips, Sheets 
& Plates – II 
 25.9.200 2 Venzeuela 
    
Fibres    
Acrylic fibre  1.7.2003 Belarus 
Mulberry Raw Silk 15.79% 17.7.2002 China  PR 
 72.96%   
Nylon Tyre Cord Fabric  29.10.2003 China  PR 
Acrylic Fibre  3.9.03 (R) Italy 
Styrene Butadiene Rubber  30.7.2003 Japan 
Acrylic Fibre  3.9.03 (R) Japan 
Polystyrene  10.2.2003 Japan 
Styrene Butadiene Rubber  30.7.2003 Korea, 
Republic of 
Polystyrene  10.2.2003 Korea, 
Republic of 
Ethylene Propylene Diene 
Rubber (EPDM) 
7.31% 27.12.2002 Korea, 
Republic of 
Polystyrene  10.2.2003 Malaysia 
Acrylic Fibre  3.9.03 (R) Portugal 
Acrylic Fibre  3.9.03 (R) Spain 
Styrene Butadiene Rubber  30.7.2003 Taipei 
Polystyrene  10.2.2003 Taipei 
Styrene Butadiene Rubber  30.7.2003 Turkey 
Styrene Butadiene Rubber  30.7.2003 United 
States 
    
Miscellaneous    
Vitamin-C 112.26% 14.8.2002 (R) Canada 
Measuring Tapes 1069% 22.10.2002 China  PR 
Float Glass 43.82% 5.7.2002 China  PR 
Vitamin-E 78.82% to 27.8.2002 China  PR 
 183.80%   
Plastic Ophthalmic Lenses 26.49% to 233% 27.8.2002 China  PR 
Vitrified Porcelain Tiles  23.5.2003 China  PR 
Vitamin-C 208.13% 14.8.2002 (R) China  PR 
Coated Paper  17.6.2003 E.U. 
X-Ray Baggage System 10.34% to 15.4.2002 Germany 
 17.59%   
Float Glass 46.52 to 79.02% 5.7.2002 Indonesia 
Thermal Sensitive Paper  29.7.2003 Indonesia 
Gypsum Plaster Board  5.8.2003 Indonesia 
Coated Paper  17.6.2003 Indonesia 
Thermal Sensitive Paper  29.7.2003 Malaysia 
Butter Oil  26.11.2002 New 
Zealand 
Green Veneer Tape 164% 9.1.2003 Taipei 
Plastic Ophthalmic Lenses 26.49% to 233.75% 27.8.2002 Taipei 
Gypsum Plaster Board  5.8.2003 Thailand 
Thermal Sensitive Paper  29.7.2003 United 
Arab 
Emirates 
Vitamin-C 97.80% 14.8.2002 United 
States 
    
TOTAL INITIATIONS FILED IN 
('02-'03) : 127 
   
 
Table A.2. 
Nominal and effective rates of protection for the manufacturing sector: 
1987-88 1997-98 Sectors 
Simple average Import weighted Simple average Import weighted 
Cotton textiles 111.9 83.8 55.5 58.2 
Woolen textiles 114.7 111.6 43.9 43.2 
Silk textiles 182.8 242.4 35.8 35.2 
Art silk and 
synthetic fiber 
textiles 
124.4 152.5 42.9 39.1 
Jute, Hemp and 
Mesta textiles 
169.0 -59.9 59.8 67.6 
Carpet weaving 147.9 153.6 44.1 43.8 
Readymade 
garments 
146.7 112.2 42.8 43.3 
Miscellaneous 
textiles Products 
156.1 170.0 44.4 40.2 
Furniture and 
Fixtures 
95.8 51.5 47.2 48.9 
Wood products 
excluding furniture 
136.3 58.1 49.8 72.8 
Paper and paper 
products 




174.3 212.0 19.1 14.2 
Leather footwear 112.4 52.3 47.7 50.5 
Leather products 
excluding footwear 
181.9 198.8 36.1 22.5 
Rubber products 177.1 258.1 48.9 51.1 
Plastic products 90.1 -32.5 32.6 32.1 
Petroleum 
products 
20.2 -92.8 79.8 40.6 
Coal and tar 
products 
135.4 135 9.8 10.2 
Inorganic heavy 
chemicals 
120.7 172 33.3 28.4 
Organic heavy 
chemicals 
32.1 82.4 30.0 22.8 
Fertilizers 116.3 131.5 12.1 18.0 
Pesticides 244.0 247.2 31.1 18.9 
Paints, varnishes 
and lacquers 
109.1 106.8 32.8 34.7 
Drugs and 
medicines 
181.3 173.7 31.6 33.4 
Soaps, cosmetics 
and glycerine 
151.3 208.9 59.5 56.8 
Synthetic fibers 
and resins 
142.4 162.0 35.5 38.0 
Other chemicals 149.9 132.4 35.2 32.1 
Structural clay 
products 
111.4 34.4 44.7 41.4 
Cement 132.1 91.7 48.0 48.4 
Other non-metallic 
mineral products 
111.8 81.8 42.4 45.0 
Iron, steel and 
ferro-alloys 
165.5 174.8 24.7 32.7 
Iron and steel 
casting and forging 
164.8 164.6 42.0 35.2 
Iron and steel 
foundries 
97.2 101.9 33.0 29.9 
Non-ferrous basic 
metals 
118.0 75.0 31.9 48.8 
Hand tools and 
hardware 
131.8 86.0 33.5 29.2 
Miscellaneous 
metal products 
46.2 49.0 24.9 20.9 
Tractors and other 
agricultural 
machinery 
48.5 34.0 15.9 15.9 
Food and textiles 
industrial  
machinery 
48.4 44.2 22.4 19.7 
Industrial 
machinery (except 
food and textile) 
39.6 37.8 19.9 19.0 












149.5 153.6 20.0 15.9 
Electrical cables 
and wires 
156.4 166.6 48.8 46.6 
Batteries 102.3 140.0 47.4 46.3 
Electrical 
appliances 
113.7 134.5 39.9 29.8 
Communication 
equipment 
53.8 63.2 33.1 30.5 
Other electrical 
machinery 




30.8 -15.7 31.7 25.8 
Ships and boats 70.2 68.4 39.8 36.3 
Rail equipment 97.5 36.3 40.2 26.4 
Motor Vehicles 93.7 -0.4 49.0 49.4 
Motor cycles and 
scooters 
49.5 33.1 44.2 44.4 
Bicycles, cycle 
rickshaws 
131.9 89.5 47.3 47.6 
Other transport 
equipment 
148.4 150.2 40.3 43.9 
Watches and 
clocks 
99.6 81.4 36.3 32.3 
Miscellaneous 823.3 908 364.4 331.7 
Source: Protection in Indian manufacturing: an empirical study, Hasheem Nouroz 
